First off, let’s set the stage. The isolated state of North Korea (DPRK) has long faced sanctions, trade isolation and financial pressure. One increasingly prominent way it raises funds is through cybercrime. According to analysis, DPRK actors exploit hacking, phishing, investment scams and cryptocurrency flows to generate foreign currency. (Global Initiative)
In this latest wave, reports suggest that North Korean hackers stole billions of dollars in crypto through hacks of exchanges, bridges and other virtual-asset platforms — and then laundered the proceeds using payment networks like Huione Pay in Cambodia. (The Korea Times)
To give concrete numbers: one report identified roughly US $1.65 billion stolen between January and September of this year by DPRK hackers, with part of that routed via the Huione platform. (The Korea Times) Meanwhile, the U.S. regulatory agency Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) found that Huione Group laundered at least US$4 billion between August 2021 and January 2025, including significant sums tied to DPRK cyber-heists. (FinCEN.gov)
So: this isn’t a small or isolated matter. It has broad implications.
How These Hacks Happen and What Laundering Looks Like
Let’s walk through how the scheme appears to function, step-by-step:
1. The theft of crypto
DPRK-linked groups (most prominently the cyber-unit known as Lazarus Group) engage in hacking of exchanges, bridges, wallets, and deception campaigns. (Wikipedia) For example, one documented hack of a virtual asset firm in the UAE, Japan, India and Singapore is attributed to DPRK actors. (The Korea Times)
These thefts yield large sums of crypto that may be cumbersome to convert into fiat due to sanctions and monitoring.
2. Conversion and obfuscation
After theft, the stolen crypto often moves through a network of wallets, chain-hops, mixers or lesser regulated trading platforms. This is to make tracing harder and to convert into forms easier to cash out. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)
For DPRK, converting into fiat or moving across jurisdictions is especially critical since traditional banking routes are largely closed.
3. Use of intermediary platforms and payment networks
This is where Huione comes into the picture. According to FinCEN and other sources, the Huione Group (and its payment arm Huione Pay) in Cambodia function as a significant node for laundering: they receive proceeds of virtual-currency heists, scam profits, investment fraud and help convert funds, remit them, or provide services that facilitate illicit flows. (FinCEN.gov)
For example, between June 2023 and February 2024 a wallet associated with Lazarus sent crypto to Huione Group-controlled wallets. (Federal Register)
4. Final extraction / use
Once the funds are laundered via these networks, DPRK can use them to purchase sanctioned goods (like dual-use items), fund its weapons and missile programmes, or repatriate currency. Reports flag that this is not minor: the hacked funds help support DPRK’s strategic programme. (The Korea Times)
Hence the big concern: this is not just cyber-theft for profit, but theft that supports a rogue state’s sanctioned activities.
What’s Especially Noteworthy About the Huione Link
Why is the Huione connection drawing such intense scrutiny? Several reasons:
- Huione Pay is based in Cambodia and appears to have fewer barriers than many Western financial firms to detect or block suspicious flows. That makes it a magnet for laundering. (Korea Joongang Daily)
- FinCEN formally designated Huione Group “of primary money-laundering concern,” proposing to sever its access to the U.S. financial system under Section 311 of the Patriot Act. (FinCEN.gov)
- The involvement of DPRK actors gives this case geopolitical weight — because the funds do not just vanish into criminal circuits; they end up supporting state-sponsored programmes. (The Korea Times)
- The numbers are substantial: one recent Korean report pegged laundering through Huione Pay by DPRK as US $2.84 billion for Jan 2024–Sep 2025. (Korea Joongang Daily)
- It highlights how the crypto ecosystem — often praised for innovation — can be exploited by advanced persistent threat actors and regimes under sanction.
The Broader Implications for Crypto, Finance & Regulation
Given this information, several “so what” implications arise.
A. Crypto infrastructure is vulnerable — and attractive
The ease with which digital assets can be moved, swapped, and concealed makes crypto a potent tool for illicit finance. While many pioneers of crypto laud its openness and freedom, this openness also opens avenues for state-sponsored theft and laundering.
The DPRK case shows that malicious actors recognize and exploit these traits.
B. Intermediary platforms matter
The fact that payment networks like Huione Pay play the role of enabler shows that crypto regulation cannot focus only on exchanges or wallets. Payment intermediaries, remittance services, overseas fintechs, and grey-market platforms all matter. Regulatory frameworks must ensure that even “exotic” fintechs maintain strong AML/KYC controls and are subject to scrutiny.
C. Sanctions enforcement goes global and complex
When you have a state actor like DPRK, sanctions regimes, multilateral counter-fraud and global regulatory coordination become vital. One country alone cannot track every flow, especially if the crypto spans multiple jurisdictions, chains, and conversion mechanisms.
This matter touches on geopolitics, national security and overseas jurisdictional cooperation.
D. Re-thinking risk and compliance regimes
The Huione case signals that firms must treat not only known bad actors, but also suspicious platforms and networks even if they appear “legitimate” on the surface. Boards, compliance officers and regulators should treat cross-border fintechs, payment platforms, and crypto ecosystems with heightened scrutiny.
In short: compliance is no longer optional, and the cost of oversight failures grows significantly.
My View: What Should Be Done Now
From where I sit, here are suggestions for what industries and regulators should do — assuming they want to reduce exposure to this kind of malicious flow.
- Stronger due diligence on fintech and payment platforms: Firms should vet counterparties globally, not only based in traditional banking jurisdictions, but wherever crypto flows go.
- Enhanced blockchain analytics usage: The tools exist to trace flows, identify high-risk wallets and follow the money. Businesses should invest more in analytic tools and share intelligence.
- Broader international coordination: Sanctions enforcement and cross‐border crypto tracing require cooperation among regulators, law enforcement and fintech firms. The DPRK case shows how funds traverse multiple jurisdictions.
- Regulatory clarity and sandboxing: Governments should set clearer rules around crypto-to‐fiat conversion, payment-service licensing, and AML obligations for crypto-adjacent entities.
- Education and awareness: Many breaches begin with phishing or social engineering — firms and individuals need ongoing training to recognize such threats.
A Caveat: The Numbers and Uncertainties
While the figures cited are large and alarming, it’s worth noting that exact amounts, timelines and the full chain of custody remain subject to certain uncertainties. For example:
- Some reports claim US $1.65 billion stolen by DPRK this year (Jan–Sep). (The Korea Times)
- Others suggest that Huione laundered around US $4 billion from August 2021–January 2025. (FinCEN.gov)
- Still other data show a US $2.84 billion laundering total through Huione Pay for a shorter window. (Korea Joongang Daily)
Different agencies may use different methodologies, define “laundered” differently (converted, remitted, cashed-out) and some flows may yet be untracked. So while the broad outlines — large scale, DPRK linked, Huione mediating — are well documented, the precise totals should be treated as best estimates, not final.
Still, the trend is clear and worrying.
What Lies in Store
Given what we know, here is what I expect or suggest we’ll see in the months ahead:
- More regulatory crackdowns: Expect more jurisdictions to designate high-risk fintech/payment platforms and cut off their access to correspondent banking or fiat rails. As happened with Huione, access to U.S. correspondent accounts is a lever.
- Increased focus on crypto-to-fiat conversion channels: The weak link tends to be where the crypto gets turned into usable fiat or goods; regulators will pay more attention there.
- Greater transparency demands for fintechs: Platforms in Cambodia, Southeast Asia, Africa and other regions might face increased scrutiny, licensing demands, AML audits and public pressure.
- More sophisticated laundering methods: DPRK and similar actors will not sit idle. They will refine their tradecraft: more mixing, more chain hopping, more use of decentralized platforms, and more efforts to hide from analytics.
- Potential reputational damage and investor caution: Firms working in crypto, payments or fintech may find that exposure to high-risk markets or counterparties creates reputational and regulatory risk. Investors may demand stronger assurances on compliance.
In short: the era of crypto being a “wild frontier” may be ending — or at least entering a new phase where regulatory and compliance pressure intensifies. And the DPRK/Huione saga is part of that transition.
Final Thoughts
When you pull back, this is about more than just “hackers stole crypto.” It’s about a confluence of factors:
- A sanctioned state (North Korea) seeking foreign currency through illicit means.
- A sophisticated cyber-hacking apparatus targeting crypto exchanges and wallets.
- A semi‐legitimate payment/fintech network (Huione Pay) in a jurisdiction with lighter barriers, becoming a laundering node.
- A global financial system that struggles to keep pace with cross-chain, cross-border crypto flows and non-bank payment platforms.
Taken together, we’re seeing the darker side of crypto. It’s not simply “technology enabling innovation”; it’s also “technology enabling state-backed crime and sanctions evasion.” That duality matters.
We are at a juncture where businesses, regulators and individuals must recognise that the crypto ecosystem is not immune from nation-state actors, criminal organisations, or large-scale financial crime.
So while the headline might be “$… billion stolen,” the deeper narrative is about global risk, regulatory gaps and the evolving nature of illicit finance.
Sources:
- FinCEN finds Cambodia-based Huione Group to be a primary money-laundering concern. (FinCEN.gov)
- Imposition of Special Measure Regarding Huione Group as a Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern. (Federal Register)
- “Where does North Korea get its cash? How the scam industry created new money laundering avenues for North Korea,” Global Initiative. (Global Initiative)
- “North Korea used Cambodian platform to launder US $2.84 billion in cryptocurrency,” Korea JoongAng Daily. (Korea Joongang Daily)
- “Sanctions watchdog links N. Korean hackers to US$1.65 billion in crypto theft this year alone,” KoreaTimes. (The Korea Times)
