In late December 2025, a major security alert reverberated across the cryptocurrency world. SlowMist Technology’s Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) issued a stark warning: devices or code repositories related to the development of the Trust Wallet browser extension may have been compromised by attackers. This development has immediate implications for users, developers, and the broader digital asset ecosystem. By examining the timeline, technical details, and responses from the community, this article provides a comprehensive understanding of what happened, the risks involved, and how stakeholders should respond.
The Trust Wallet Incident: A High-Level Overview
Earlier in December 2025, users of the Trust Wallet browser extension began reporting unusual activity involving unauthorized wallet access and asset draining. Blockchain security analysts soon linked these reports to a potentially malicious update in the Trust Wallet extension’s code.
According to latest reports, the compromised version in question is Trust Wallet Browser Extension version 2.68, which was found to contain a backdoor capable of exfiltrating sensitive user information, including mnemonic phrases that control access to crypto assets. Trust Wallet responded by urging users to disable that extension version and update to the patched 2.69 release immediately. (Cryptonews)
However, the severity of the situation deepened when security researchers from SlowMist concluded that the attack vector may not have been limited to the software itself, but could extend to developer systems or code repositories — a supply chain attack that reaches beyond the ordinary.
What Analysts Identified in the Malicious Code
SlowMist’s analysis revealed that the attackers inserted suspicious code into the official Trust Wallet extension build. Specifically, a JavaScript library identified as PostHog was embedded, ostensibly for analytics but ultimately programmed to collect user wallet data and send it to an external server at api.metrics-trustwallet[.]com. Reports suggest that this server was controlled by the attackers, meaning the modification was a secret data exfiltration backdoor. (ODaily)
This backdoor was not an obvious error or a simple bug. It was a purposeful insertion of malicious behavior in code that otherwise appeared legitimate — precisely what makes this a supply chain threat. Unlike a typical phishing attack or user-level exploit, where individuals are tricked into revealing information, a supply chain compromise means users who do everything “right” can still be affected because the attack operates at a trusted layer: the official extension release.
Timeline of the Compromise
The estimated sequence of events — based on SlowMist’s and independent analysts’ investigations — illustrates how the breach unfolded:
- December 8: The attacker began preparations, presumably gaining access to developer environments or the code pipeline.
- December 22: The backdoor was successfully embedded into the extension code.
- December 25: Exploitation appears to have begun in earnest, with stolen mnemonic phrases used to initiate unauthorized transfers from users still running the compromised extension. (ODaily)
Notably, the attacker took advantage of the holiday period around December 25th, when developer and user attention may have been reduced — a common tactic in cybercrime to increase chances of success.
Scale of Losses and User Impact
Independent blockchain investigations have placed the estimated losses from this exploit in the multi-million-dollar range. Reports describe upwards of $6 million in crypto assets being siphoned from affected Trust Wallet users across Solana, Bitcoin, and EVM-compatible chains. (Cryptonews)
These figures are early estimates and still evolving as analysts track funds on-chain through tools such as Arkham and PeckShield. It is important to note that such tracking often underestimates total losses because sophisticated attackers use a sequence of wallet hops and mixers to obscure the final resting place of stolen funds.
While the focus here is on browser extension users, mobile Trust Wallet users — especially those not using the compromised extension — may not be directly affected. However, the incident raises broader concerns about systemic trust and governance around wallet software as a distribution medium.
Why This Is More Than a Regular Breach
The Trust Wallet incident is not just another wallet hack or phishing scam. It raises significant supply chain security concerns. Historically, wallet compromises have often been traced back to user error, phishing links, or malicious third-party applications. However, when trusted development infrastructure or code repositories are compromised, every user of the software — regardless of their personal security practices — is put at risk.
To contextualize this, consider a comparison:
- Phishing attack: User is tricked into giving up a seed phrase via a fake prompt.
- Fake extension impersonation: Scammers publish unauthentic wallet extensions that mimic a real wallet.
- Supply chain compromise: The official wallet’s code itself is altered without user knowledge, making typical reliance on “official” updates insufficient.
Such supply chain attacks have precedent in other tech sectors, where attackers compromise developer credentials or CI/CD pipelines to insert malicious code into widely distributed products. The implications for blockchain wallets — where users keep irreversible access to high-value assets — are exceptionally serious.
Developer Device and Repository Risk
What makes the SlowMist warning especially notable is the suggestion that developer devices or code repositories may have been compromised. This implies that attackers possibly breached internal systems — whether through stolen credentials, insecure remote access, or vulnerabilities in cloud-based repositories.
This scenario is more alarming because it suggests the attackers had deeper access than just the public extension code. They may have seen or manipulated development assets that should have been private, such as early builds, deployment scripts, or encryption keys.
SlowMist’s CISO publicly stated that affected developer systems should be disconnected from networks immediately and investigated to prevent further leakage or presence of additional backdoors. (ChainCatcher)
Immediate Recommendations for Users
Given the severity of the situation, the following steps are recommended for Trust Wallet users:
- Disable the compromised extension (version 2.68) immediately if it is installed in your browser. Only install or update from the official Chrome Web Store to version 2.69 or higher. (Blockchain News)
- Disconnect from the internet before exporting mnemonic phrases: If you need to move assets, do so offline to ensure malicious scripts cannot transmit sensitive data. (YouToCoin)
- Transfer funds to a secure wallet: Use a hardware wallet or trusted mobile app version not associated with the compromised extension.
- Revoke all approvals for dApps and transaction signing requests you have granted through the compromised wallet.
- Monitor official Trust Wallet announcements and support channels for updates and any built-in reimbursement programs. Users should always verify links and sources to avoid additional scams.
Trust Wallet’s Official Response
As of this writing, Trust Wallet has acknowledged the browser extension security incident and urged users to upgrade away from the compromised version. Official posts on the wallet’s X (formerly Twitter) account provide guidance on how to disable the older extension and link to the Chrome Web Store for the patched version. (Cryptonews)
However, this acknowledgment focuses on the user update path rather than addressing the broader implications of a potentially compromised developer environment. A comprehensive official security audit and third-party review of development infrastructure might be necessary to restore trust.
Long-Term Implications for the Crypto Ecosystem
This incident underscores the evolving threat landscape in Web3 and decentralized finance. As developers build increasingly complex ecosystems of wallets, dApps, bridges, and marketplaces, the attack surface grows correspondingly.
A compromised wallet extension — especially one with user-friendly analytics or telemetry code like PostHog — can bypass many of the individual best practices that users might employ to protect themselves. Even sophisticated, cautious users could still be victimized if the code they download from an “official” source is malicious.
Furthermore, incidents like this accelerate the need for strong developer security practices, including:
- Secure credential storage and multi-factor authentication (MFA).
- Least-privilege access controls on code repositories.
- Regular dependency audits and signing of builds.
- Isolation of production release keys from developer machines.
These practices mirror those recommended in enterprise scenarios and are increasingly essential in decentralized technology contexts where trust is distributed.
Broader Discussions Around Wallet Safety
For readers interested in broader wallet safety practices, consider official guidance on avoiding fake apps and uninsured wallet services. Trust Wallet’s own security recommendations recommend avoiding third-party app stores and verifying official sources before downloading or connecting wallets. (Trust Wallet)
Additionally, general awareness of scams and fake browser extensions is crucial. For example, in mid-2025, researchers highlighted the proliferation of fake wallet extensions targeting Firefox users, including imitations of major wallets like MetaMask and Coinbase. (CryptoRank)
These broader trends underscore that attackers operate on many fronts — from fake apps to supply chain compromises to phishing campaigns. Vigilance and layered security practices remain essential.
Final Thoughts
The SlowMist warning about potential compromise of Trust Wallet developer devices or code repositories marks a critical moment for blockchain security. It highlights the persistent risk of supply chain attacks and the need for fortified developer infrastructure. At the same time, it serves as a stark reminder that trusted wallets — even widely used ones — are not immune to sophisticated threats.
For users and developers alike, the focus now must be on containment, remediation, and long-term improvement of security practices. As this story continues to unfold, one fact is clear: decentralized systems only remain secure when the community, developers, and organizations work collaboratively to protect them.
Sources:
- SlowMist warning on compromised developer devices or repositories — Odaily & YouToCoin summaries. (ODaily)
- Trust Wallet extension compromise, losses, and patch guidance — CryptoNews.com and Blockchain.News. (Cryptonews)
- ChainCatcher report on SlowMist CISO statement. (ChainCatcher)
- Trust Wallet security guidance on fake apps. (Trust Wallet)
- Broader wallet extension issues and fake extensions report. (CryptoRank)
